with her ideas and her precepts for how to be a humane, engaged scholar. But of course we also miss her a great deal.
When I was struggling to come up with a theme for my inaugural lecture, I found myself returning over and over to essays in which Ann posed this question: what if we wrote the history of science from the perspective of applied science?
2 And just as I came to the conclusion that that is the question that I've spent most of my career trying to, Ann's condition worsened. So I would like to dedicate these remarks to her, as an acknowledgement of both personal and professional debt. Now, I won't claim to answer Ann's question, so this lecture merely points "toward" a history of science from the perspective of applied science. I'll begin by defining some terms, I'll show that we don't have enough answers to Ann's question and I'll speculate as to why, and then I'll tell some stories that show why Ann's question is important for more than academic reasons.
But the question itself won't be answered overnight. Indeed, the question is not a new one, though it took Ann's characteristic bluntness to pose it directly. Many colleagues, such as Ernst
Homburg and Lissa Roberts, have worked on this topic for some time. technology studies -which is why this is the premier place to be the Chair in the History of Science, Technology, and Innovation.
But before we can start to answer the question, "what if we wrote the history of science from the perspective of applied science?" we first need some definitions. What, after all, is applied science? For most of the late Cold War period, the American policymakers, scientists, engineers, and protestors who are the central actors in much of my work routinely used that phrase to characterize certain kinds of knowledge-generating activities, usually in contrast with either "fundamental" or "basic" research. In STS we know, of course, that "applied" and "basic" are social constructions, that different groups draw the boundary differently (or don't draw it at all), that no rule tells us whether a given piece of research is being carried out to solve a particular problem or to enlarge our understanding of the world around us. Notably, the historical actors who invoked these concepts were quite aware of this point: they keenly felt both the interpretive flexibility and the reality of the distinction between basic and applied. Harvey
Brooks, a semiconductor physicist at General Electric and then Harvard, and something of a public intellectual in the US Cold War applied science community, made that point better than I could in a 1967 opinion piece for Science:
In institutions whose missions include the application of research results to products or operations, the categorization of research into basic or applied is not too meaningful and has little operational value… [A]ll research in a "mission-oriented" organization contributes or should contribute, however remotely in time, to the general objectives of the organization. On the other hand, there is clearly a spectrum of activities ranging from pure research on the one hand to technological development on the other, and to some extent one can locate research activities within this spectrum according to their "appliedness."
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Here, Brooks invokes a "spectrum" from basic to applied as common sense, if difficult to define precisely or use effectively. applied science in, among other places, corporations, advising on how to get tax breaks by shifting funds toward basic research, as well as in the Pentagon, assigning degrees of "appliedness" to procurement contracts, and in science funding agencies keeping track of where their money went. Right there, you can start to see that when historians of science examine the distinction between basic and applied they find a lot to say about bureaucracies, capitalism, and the national security state -things we'd all benefit from understanding better.
So how did the Pentagon's accountants draw the distinction between basic and applied?
What determined where a piece of research was situated on Brooks' spectrum of "appliedness"?
Brooks offered two criteria: "the time scale on which the research is likely to find an application, and the specificity with which the domain of application can be foreseen." If you do something in the laboratory now, with the expectation that you will see your work in some form on the battlefield or on the market in a year or two, then you're doing applied research. If you know exactly what form your work will take on the battlefield or market, whatever the timescale, you're also doing applied research. But Brooks' definition is hardly uncontested. Many other criteria for distinguishing basic from applied have been offered over the years: basic research was sometimes characterized as "curiosity-driven" and applied as "problem-oriented"; basic as "esoteric" (i.e., of interest only to specialists) and applied as "interdisciplinary;" basic as "foundational," i.e. what students should learn first or what actually was discovered first, while applied was supposed to come after the foundation had been laid.
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All of these criteria are problematic when you look closer. For instance, some people find researching circuits just as "curiosity-driven" a pursuit as researching quarks and quasars.
In many historical episodes, such as the laws of thermodynamics, supposedly "foundational" knowledge only emerged after the applied understanding that led to it.
Because these criteria are so arguable, I won't offer a fixed definition of applied science.
As Robert Bud puts it, applied science is "a phrase in search of a meaning. In other words, one of the "family resemblances" that characterizes many, though not all, applied scientists is that they move easily between domains. I noticed this, almost twenty years ago now, in doing interviews for my PhD thesis: many of my interviewees had degrees in a "science," but their current job title contained the word "engineering," or vice versa. A few were doing science or engineering but had no degrees in those fields -their backgrounds were in whitewater rafting or psychology or even history. Others were trained as scientists and engineers but in their current practice they were entrepreneurs or grant officers.
It can be difficult to categorize such people and follow them around. Historians of science still divide themselves along lines provided by the scientific disciplines, so people who wander among disciplines fall off our radars. Thus, histories of science that prominently feature these wandering applied scientists are still the exception rather than the rule. I don't want to exaggerate this point, but let me offer one anecdote to show that most histories of science are still Alternatively, Rebecca Press Schwartz shows that the American national security state promoted the visibility of basic research starting in the 1940s precisely because there were no security concerns in doing so -whereas applied science was so valuable it had to be buried. 15 Practically, commercial and national security interests make historical sources relating to applied science hard to access. Conversely, institutions that generate basic science, such as universities, are happy to make documents relating to their discoveries available to historians. Thus, more
histories get written about basic science, so that's where the historical conversation focuses, and studies of applied science move to the margins because their findings are hard to fit with established narratives.
Unfortunately, historians haven't adequately acknowledged that we reproduce the sciences' own prestige asymmetries. I'm walking onto thinner ice here, but it's not entirely unfair to say that many historians of science until the 1970s simply didn't consider applied science to be science. "Science" was an intellectual endeavor conducted with no thought of gain or utility, aspiring to universal relevance rather than to the solving of specific problems -except under duress or extreme necessity. 16 After Kuhn's Structure of Scientific Revolutions appeared in the early '60s, attitudes slowly changed -but not in a way that gave much more primacy to applied science, at least not as Harvey Brooks would recognize it.
Instead, the consensus emerged among historians that all science was applied science in some way, so there was little need to say anything specifically about Brooksian applied science:
Galileo was trying to work his way up the patronage ladder at the Medici court, Boyle aimed to reconstruct English society after the Civil War, Newton was an alchemist and bloodthirsty master of the mint. 17 Historians of science began to acknowledge the contexts of application which informed their cast of characters, but the cast itself did not really expand to include people like Harvey Brooks. It has expanded in other ways, particularly since the beginning of the current century: to encompass more women, more people from the working class and the Global South, and so on. 18 And rightly so; my point that we should also pay attention to people like Brooks should complement, and not distract from, the broader diversification of the stories historians of science tell. Brooks and his colleagues were hardly subalterns -they were influential people, so if we want to understand how science works we need to pay more attention to how they used that influence, for good and bad.
In Kroto, at a conference, Kroto immediately saw the AP2 as simulating the conditions that generate interstellar dust: intense heat (in a star) followed by intense cold (in the void of space).
Kroto was one of the proponents of a theory that much interstellar matter is composed of longchain carbon molecules, and he therefore asked Smalley to put a carbon disc in the AP2 to test this idea.
After some delay, Smalley agreed to do so, Kroto flew to Houston, and Smalley's graduate students ran the experiment. Unexpectedly, they found that the AP2 spit out molecules containing exactly sixty carbon atoms at a much higher rate than molecules of any other size. In fact, in the five-year period when no one could make significant quantities of C 60 , Smalley started to abandon fullerenes and move back to research on semiconductors. When fullerene research rebounded in the early '90s, Smalley reversed course -not so much because he saw a future for C 60 but because of the nearly simultaneous discovery of nanotubes, which he believed could be used in microelectronic circuits (whereas C 60 could not). Indeed, nanotube research only took off because of advances made at two electronics firms, NEC and IBM.
Notably, the social capital Smalley acquired from the C 60 discovery -including the Nobel Prize given for that discovery -was spent on convincing Rice to hire people in fields related to molecular electronics rather than in more basic fields. Moreover, when Smalley founded a company to manufacture nanotubes, the main market he targeted was electronics firms such as The research program I would like to carry out over the next several years would squarely confront that mystery. We need to know why oil firms invested so heavily in alternative energy and in environmentalism in the 1970s. Were they sincere, were they cynically trying to undermine these fields, or were they perhaps hedging their bets in a period of great uncertainty? Given that they did make these investments, what happened to them? Do biotechnology, nuclear power, and solar energy still bear oil's fingerprints? How did some of the leading firms in this industry, such as Exxon and Shell, move from seeing their interests as aligned -at least partially -with environmentalists and alternative energy advocates, to believing by the 1990s that their interests were best served by alignment with climate denialists?
As I've begun to explore these questions, it has recently dawned on me that the fullerene story can also be told from the perspective of petrochemistry. Rick Smalley's connections to microelectronics were almost entirely imagined -he hoped that someday he would be a big player in that industry -but his connections to oil were real, and varied. After college he worked at Shell Research for several years. When he arrived at Rice University, he immediately had access to research funding from both oil firms and philanthropies founded by oil executives, most notably the Welch Foundation. Exxon even paid him to build a replica of the AP2 for use by their researchers -though it seems that that research was oriented more to Exxon's involvement in nuclear energy than oil. 26 In fact, before Curl, Kroto, and Smalley met in 1985, the Exxon team had already published a study of carbon in which they almost saw the C 60 anomaly but dismissed it. As it turned out, fullerenes, and especially nanotubes, had been noticed but not commented on for decades by researchers working on soot, for example in the residue of fuel combustion. 27 Later, in the 1990s, Smalley's group gained a reputation for making extremely high-quality nanotubes using a synthesis technique borrowed from the petrochemical industry. 28 Hence, when Smalley founded his start-up company, he brought in veterans of that industry to run it and invest in it.
That is, the history of fullerene research is shot through with debts to oil firms, even though the fullerene research community has mostly generated quite basic research with little direct relevance to oil. Nor is fullerene research unique -many basic research fields are awash in money, personnel, tools, materials, and ideas borrowed from oil. As we head toward an economy that is less dependent on oil, we should start planning now for a research system in which oil has less influence over the research agenda. Oil's declining influence is salutary, but we also need to note that oil firms currently provide resources that circulate people, tools, materials, and ideas around the research system -resources we have become dependent upon, without even knowing it. My hope is that my research program can contribution to deliberation about oil's role in innovation, innovation's role in the oil industry's failure to confront climate change, and the organization of innovation in the hopefully fast-approaching world that is less dependent on oil.
These aren't hypothetical or esoteric questions, as shown by two news items that appeared within a few weeks of each other in 2017. One was an announcement of a collaboration between Maastricht University and Saudi Aramco, the Saudi national oil company, to research the "sustainability of biobased materials in a circular economy. were invented and initially developed in private firms, particularly IBM and AT&T. 36 It was only thanks to those firms that the technology matured to the point where a global community of academic researchers could grow around it. Still, everyone in that community had to build their own microscope until a professor at the University of California decided to commercialize his departmental colleague's design -just the kind of privatization of publicly-funded research which many STS scholars are critical of. And rightly so, sometimes -although in this case, a great deal of publicly available, basic research has only become possible because academic scientists can now buy microscopes instead of building them.
Conversely, my current research is on public sector science in the 1970s. Here, I think you can make a case that at the end of the '70s private interests did curtail the academic and government research into environmental problems, disability technologies, mass transportation, public housing which boomed at the beginning of the decade. 37 But that early-'70s boom in public sector research only erupted thanks to a backlash against basic research -a backlash promoted largely by antiwar and left-leaning activists who believed, with some justification, that scientists were using their dedication to basic research to avoid taking responsibility for their complicity in the Vietnam War and in order to discourage their students from becoming politically aware. The politics of basic and applied, public and private can get very complicated indeed.
Thus, there are few reliable benchmarks for judging cases like these. Instead, we can look to perspectives from science and technology studies which allow for complexity, such as actor-network theory or the co-productionist framework most associated with Sheila Jasanoff.
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In this case, both ANT and co-production would encourage us to ask something like, what kind of world comes into being when partnerships like this are allowed, and is that the kind of world that we want? Writing the history of science from both the perspective of applied and basic research helps us to imagine those possible future worlds and to deliberate -alongside sociologists, anthropologists, philosophers, and other STS practitioners -as to whether or not those are the future worlds that we want.
That is, writing histories which run back and forth across Harvey Brooks' spectrum of applied-ness allows us to see aspects of those imagined futures which unsettle reflex responses such as "basic research good" or "oil bad." When I think about the discovery of C 60 in the way that Ann Johnson taught me to see, for instance, I don't think she would've been concerned that Rick Smalley was funded by oil companies or that he patented his publicly-funded research or used public funds to seed a start-up company. For her, those were long-standing facets of applied science, without which it would be difficult to sustain basic science. But she would've been concerned that the discovery of a new allotrope of carbon, and the Nobel Prize awarded for it, allowed Rick Smalley and Harry Kroto to build up personal fiefdoms centered on their charismatic authority in which they determined the fates of dozens of students and colleagues.
To conclude: history is about telling stories. Academic historians tell stories from a particular perspective, and try to be as explicit as possible about that perspective. Our vantage points both enable and constrain, reveal and obscure. The history of science as told from the perspective of applied science is no more complete than that told from the history of basic science. But by telling our story from multiple vantages we reveal our assumptions, and foreground factors which were backgrounded in other tellings. Some of those assumptions have important implications for how our stories are taken up in public debate -so clarifying vantage points, and telling stories from multiple perspectives, allows historians to refine the relevance of their stories. But beyond the search for relevance we should treasure such stories for their common, intrinsic value. History itself is both a basic and applied science. Stories when told well are enjoyable, motivating, lesson-conferring, solidarity-inspiring. Telling the history of science from only one perspective leaves a wealth of stories locked away. Researching, telling, reading, listening to stories about science from multiple perspectives has given me great personal enjoyment from an early age, and great personal satisfaction for more than twenty years. I look forward to many more years of both personal and professional engagement with these stories from my new vantage as Chair in the History of Science, Technology, and Innovation at Maastricht University.
